Buffalo Law Review
Volume 10

Number 1

Article 16

10-1-1960

Civil Procedure—Direct Estoppel of Wrongful Death Action
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Civil Procedure—Direct Estoppel of Wrongful Death Action, 10 Buff. L. Rev. 77 (1960).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol10/iss1/16

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
tion of the common law, Section 211-a allows a right of contribution if two
conditions exist: (1) a joint money judgment against the tort-feasors, and (2)
the payment by one tort-feasor of more than his pro-rata share. 25
The appellafit felt these two conditions were met in this case. The trial
court issued a joint judgment and the appellant paid the entire modified judgment of the Appellate Division. This, the appellant felt, established a right to
appeal based on the holding of Epstein v. National Transportation Co.26 In
that case a joint judgment was rendered against two defendants. One defendant
paid the entire judgment and received a default judgment against the other
defendant for contribution. The non-paying defendant then appealed the
original judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant who had
paid was granted permission to be a respondent to this appeal in place of the
plaintiff, because he was a party aggrieved by the appeal within the meaning
of Section 557.
The respondent in the instant case argued that the hospital was not a party
aggrieved under Section 557 because no rights under Section 211-a ever arose.
There must be payment of a joint judgment by one defendant before the rights
under Section 211-a arise. Here the appellant paid when the only outstanding
judgment was one against him alone, the other defendant having been dismissed
by the Appellate Division. Although there once was a joint judgment, there
never was a payment of a joint judgment. As a result the right of contribution
never arose and there was no way in which the appellant was "aggrieved" by
the Appellate Division decision. Appellant, therefore, had no right to appeal.
The Epstein case is distinguishable. The defendant paid the entire judgment in that case when the joint judgment was outstanding.
The majority accepted the respondent's contention in finding no right to
appeal. The dissent felt the hospital owner was a party aggrieved because the
potential right of contribution was lost by the Appellate Division determination.
The majority opinion demonstrates that in order for Section 211-a to
operate there must not only be a joint money judgment against two or more
tort-feasors and payment by one tort-feasor of more than his pro-rata share,
but the payment must be made while the joint judgment is outstanding. Any
further deviation from the practice at common law must be clearly stipulated
by the Legislature.
DIRECT

ESTOPPEL OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION

The Court of Appeals, in Peare v. Griggs r held a previous Virginia
property damage action was res judicata as to the present wrongful death action
litigated in the New York courts.
The controversy arose out of an automobile accident occurring in Virginia
25. Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317 (1932).
26. 287 N.Y. 456, 40 N.E.2d 632 (1942).
27. 8 N.Y.2d 44, 201 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1960).
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in which plaintiff's husband was killed in a collision involving his car, owned
jointly with plaintiff, and a tractor trailor owned by defendants. A property
damage action was commenced in Virginia by the present defendant against the
present plaintiff, who appeared in that suit both individually and as administratrix of her husband's estate. Judgment in the Virginia action was rendered
against the present plaintiff.
Plaintiff then commenced the instant wrongful death action in New York,
and was awarded a jury verdict in the trial court. That Court held the Virginia
action was not res judicata because the judgment roll in the Virginia action
was entered against plaintiff individually and neglected to name her as her
husband's administratrix.
The Appellate Division reversed,2s and dismissed on the grounds that the
absence of the designation of plaintiff's capacity as administratrix was a mere
clerical error, and since the record shows she had her day in court in both
capacities, the former judgment was binding 2 9 It might also be noted that
since plaintiff controlled the defense of, and the appeal from, the judgment in
the Virginia action, she is estopped from prosecuting the present action. 30
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, plaintiff contended two points against
the defense of res judicata.
The first point was that she wa§ conducting this wrongful death action in
her own right and' as her own cause of action as widow of the decedent, and
was therefore suing as a different party than a mere representative of decedent's
estate as she was in the Virginia action. The second point was that her appearance as administratrix in the Virginia action was without authority, and therefore the trial of an issue purporting to be against the estate was of no avail and
a nullity. She bases this argument on the fact that she was administering
decedent's estate under limited letters of administration issued in New York
under authority of the Surrogates Court Act, 31 and that the powers vested
in her as administratrix were confined to commencing this wrongful death action
in New York State.
As to her first argument, the Court calls attention to the Virginia wrongful
death statute, 32 which is controlling here.33 That statute differs from the
New York statute, 34 in that, unlike the latter which creates a new and original
cause of action, the Virginia statute will "simply continue, transmit, or substitute
the right to sue which the decedent had until his death, . . ."31 Therefore, the
Court holds that regardless of how the Virginia action is viewed, plaintiff's
appearance in this Court is of necessity in a representative capacity. Thus, the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
(1946).

7 A.D.2d 303, 182 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1st Dep't 1959).
See 49 CJS. judgments § 75(a) (1947).
Fish v. Vanderlip, 218 N.Y. 29, 112 N.E. 425 (1916).
N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act § 122.
Code Va. 1950, § 8-633.
Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412 (1945).
N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §§ 130-134.
Street v. Consumers Mining Corporation, 185 Va. 561, 570, 39 S.E.2d 271, 274
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same issue determined in the Virginia property action, specifically that plaintiff's
husband was negligent, was a common and vital element in a wrongful death
action. And, since plaintiff is only being substituted into her husband's right,
the finding in the property action must resultingly be binding on her action for
wrongful death.
As to the second argument, the Court holds that the letters of administration issued to plaintiff expressly authorized her to administer the estate of the
deceased. The only limitation on the authority granted to her was that she
could not compromise the wrongful death action or enforce a judgment obtained
therein until further court order. She had every right and in fact every reason
to appear in the Virginia action in order to protect her claim for wrongful death.
By a unanimous decision the Court affirms, holding plaintiff had her day
in court and is barred from relitigating the issues decided adversely to her in
the Virginia action.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND NEcESS iTY OF SUBPOENA
PRACTICE ACT SECTION

UNDER CIVIL

406

Section 353 of the Civil Practice Act establishes the privileged relationship
of attorney and client and prohibits the attorney from disclosing communications between them. Since the purpose of this statute is to secure the orderly
administration of justice, by encouraging frank disclosures to attorneys by
their clients, it is permissible for a client to waive the privilege. However, an
attorney may never disclose privileged communications unless authorized to do
so by his client. 36

In In re KaplaZ,37 an attorney who represented a trade association voluntarily appeared before the Municipal Commissioner of Investigation and gave
information concerning illegal parking of trailer trucks on the waterfront. The
attorney indicated that this condition was allowed to exist because of the
influence of two powerful politicians. In answer to questions of the Commissioner the attorney revealed that he obtained his information from a member
of the trade association but declined to give the name of the member, claiming
the attorney-client privilege.
The Commissioner moved for an order for the arrest of the attorney,
pursuant to Section 406 of the Civil Practice Act, for refusal to answer the
question. The Special Term granted the order stating, "Until there is a client,
there is no attorney-clienti relationship. So in order to establish it the name
must be revealed."'38 The Appellate Division affirmed the order with two
justices dissenting.3 9 The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the lower
courts on the ground that the imprisonment of a witness, under Section 406
36. People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 87 N.E. 457 (1909). Matter of Reinhardt, 95
Misc. 413, 160 N.Y. Supp. 828 (Surr. Ct. 1915).
37. 8 N.Y.2d 214, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960).
38. In re Blumenfeld, 22 Misc. 2d 839, 840, 200 N.YS.2d 836, 837 (County Ct. 1960).
39. In re Blumenfeld, 10 A.D.2d 909, 202 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Ist Dep't 1960).

